Challenging the Assessment of the California Timber Yield Tax Against Purchasers of Indian Timber by Vick, Margaret
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 4 Article 14
1-1-1982
Challenging the Assessment of the California
Timber Yield Tax Against Purchasers of Indian
Timber
Margaret Vick
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Margaret Vick, Challenging the Assessment of the California Timber Yield Tax Against Purchasers of Indian Timber, 13 Pac. L. J. 1325
(1982).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol13/iss4/14
Challenging the Assessment of the
California Timber Yield Tax Against
Purchasers of Indian Timber
Indians occupy a unique place in American jurisprudence. They are
accorded a status and protection not enjoyed by other ethnic groups.'
The special treatment given Indians has developed from the historical
concept that Indian tribes were sovereign entities.2 This status as a
"sovereign" allowed the federal government to govern the Indians first
through treaty and later through separate statutes and regulations.
3
Today the remnants of Indian sovereignty color all federal and state
actions affecting Indians.4
The Supreme Court has developed three constitutional theories to
determine the limits of state regulation of Indian affairs.5 The three
theories recognize the traditional notion of Indian sovereignty and in-
validate the state action if (1) the state infringes on the Indian right to
self-government,6 (2) the federal government preempts the state action
by regulating the same activity,7 or (3) the tribal interest in remaining
free from state interference outweighs the state interest in the action.'
The concept of Indian sovereignty retains some vitality, as the Supreme
Court has recently used each of these tests to delineate the limits of the
state taxing power over Indians and those who conduct business with
Indians.9
California is currently assessing a timber yield tax against purchasers
of Indian timber' ° and this would seem to violate the constitutional
1. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW XXi-XXiv (1945).
2. Mettler, A Unfted Theory ofIndian Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 89, 112-20
(1979); Comment, The Limits of Indian Sovereignty; The Tribe Confronts the State in On-Reserva-
tion Taxation of Non-Indians, 18 HOUSTON L. REV. 563, 566-69 (1981).
3. See generally Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country;4 Defense of Federal Protection of
Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979 (1981).
4. See generally Id.
5. See generally, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
6. See, e.g., 425 U.S. at 483; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
7. See, e.g., 448 U.S. at 144-45; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S.
685, 690 (1965).
8. 447 U.S. at 156-57.
9. See generally, e.g., 448 U.S. 136; 447 U.S. 134; 425 U.S. 463.
10. See CAL. RE. & TAx. CODE §§38101, 38115.
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theories based on Indian sovereignty. Prior to the enactment of the
timber yield tax, counties in California assessed an annual property tax
on standing timber based on the value of the timber at the time of
assessment, i e. an ad valorem tax. 1 Under the ad valorem system In-
dian timber was exempt from taxation. 2 The ad valorem system was
severely criticized, however, and the California Legislature attempted a
patchwork solution by enacting an exemption for reforested timber. 13
The exemption had such an adverse impact on forest management and
local government revenues that the legislature, in the face of severe
criticism from timber owners, environmentalists, and county govern-
ments, enacted the timber yield tax to replace the ad valorem tax. 4
Unfortunately, the legislature did not consider the unique situation of
Indian timber when the timber yield tax was formulated.
The timber yield tax is a one-time assessment at the time of harvest,"
and thus eliminates many of the problems caused by the ad valorem
tax system. 16 The tax is assessed against the owner of the timber at the
time of harvest, unless the owner is an exempt entity."7 If the owner is
exempt from the tax, the tax is assessed against the first non-exempt
purchaser of the timber.18 Since Indian timber is exempt from direct
tax, 19 the assessment against the purchasers of Indian timber allows the
state of California to tax the previously untaxed Indian timber. The
effect is to reduce the revenue of the Indian tribes. The Hoopa Timber
Corporation, an Indian-owned company, is contesting the assessment
of the timber yield tax against its customers20 and the challenge is now
pending before the State Board of Equalization.2 This comment ex-
amines whether the imposition of the timber yield tax against purchas-
11. Each county assessed a timber tax according to the authority given in CAL. CONST. art.
XIII, §3(j). See, REviEv/ OF SELECTED 1976 CALFORNIA LEGISLATION, 8 PAC. L.J. 371, 378-79
(1977) [hereinafter cited as REVIEW].
12. See white Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 (1980); Squire v. Capoeman,
351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956). This exemption is directly related to that afforded Indian land. 25 U.S.C.
§465 (1976).
13. CAL. CONST. art. XIII §12 3/4 (repealed Nov. 5, 1974); See Unkel & Cromwell, Califor-
nia' Tumber Yield Tax, 6 ECOLOGY L. Q. 831, 834 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Unkel &
Cromwell].
14. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 839-42; REVIEW, supra note 11, at 378-379.
15. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§38108-38110.
16. Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 83942.
17. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§38101, 38108-38110, 38115.
18. Id. at §§38101, 38115.
19. See note 12 supra.
20. Telephone conversation with Clarence Hossler, Assistant Manager, Hoopa Timber Cor-
poration, (Sept. 29, 1981) (notes on fie at the Pacpfc Law Journal).
21. This comment will not discuss the specific challenge by the Hoopa Timber Corporation.
This comment is limited to the general principles of law applicable to a challenge of the timber
yield tax by any of the Indian tribes located within California. This comment will not discuss any
other aspect of the Z'berg-Warren-Collier-Keate Forest Taxation Reform Act, CAL. STATS. 1976,
c. 176, §§1-23, at 293.
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ers of Indian timber is a valid exercise of the state power of taxation.
This examination requires an analysis of the purposes and policies of
the timber yield tax22 and an investigation of the three theories of In-
dian law used to test the state taxing power.23 This comment will
demonstrate that the application of the timber yield tax to purchasers
of Indian timber is valid if the infringement test is employed 24 but in-
valid under both the federal preemption25 and the balancing of inter-
ests tests. 6 This leads to the conclusion that the assessment of the
timber yield tax against purchasers of Indian timber is beyond the lim-
its of the state taxing power.27 An initial discussion of the enactment of
the timber yield tax, however, is necessary to understand the applica-
tion of the tax to purchasers of Indian timber and to determine the
state's interest in imposing the tax.
CALIFORNIA'S TIMBER YIELD TAX
California taxes forest resources by use of the recently enacted tim-
ber yield tax. The timber yield tax is assessed against timber owners,28
or, if the owner is an exempt entity, against the first non-exempt pur-
chaser of the timber.29 The application of the timber yield tax to In-
dian timber can best be understood by considering the reasons that the
tax was enacted.
A. Taxing Timber Prior to the Timber Yield Tax
Before the enactment of the timber yield tax, ad valorem taxes were
assessed annually against timber owners according to the fair market
value of standing timber at the time of assessment.30 This annual as-
sessment had an adverse impact on forest management. 31 Three major
groups expressed their dissatisfaction with the annual tax by exerting
pressure on the legislature to change to a different tax system.32
22. See text accompanying notes 28-41 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 62-82, 92-132, 145-151 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 83-91 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 133-44 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 152-63 infra.
27. See text accompanying note 163 infra.
28. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§38101, 38115.
29. Id.
30. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, §3(); REVIEW, supra note 11, at 378-79 (1977).
31. See generally Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13; REVIEW, supra note 11.
32. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 839-42; REvIEw, supra note 11, at 379. Timber
owners opposed the ad valorem system because it required them to pay an annual tax on standing
timber for many years prior to realizing any income. Because the rotation cycle of timber is often
50 to 75 years, the annual tax bills accumulated for a considerable time prior to harvest and sale.
This also had the effect of discouraging investment in the state's forestry resources because poten-
tial investors were unwilling to expend money in annual taxes when higher returns could be ob-
tained by investing in other areas. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 832-33; REVIEW,
supra note 11, at 378-79.
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The Legislature attempted to deal with the problem by providing a
tax exemption if an owner reforested after a seventy percent harvest.33
This exemption, however, had an adverse effect on forest management
by encouraging timber owners to harvest trees prematurely. 34 Environ-
mentalists voiced concern over this taxing structure since it encouraged
depletion of timber resources and ignored the environmental benefits
of timber.35 County governments disapproved of the taxing structure
because it caused substantial reductions in county revenues.36 The
counties also faced the difficulty of assessing the value of standing tim-
ber that did not qualify for the exemption.37
Thus the concerns expressed by timber owners, environmentalists,
and county governments centered around the requirement of an annual
assessment and the adverse effect of this assessment on timber manage-
ment. By changing the method and time of assessment many of these
problems were eliminated.
B. The Timber Yield Tax as a Remedy
The timber yield tax is assessed at the time of harvest.38 This one-
time assessment eliminates the interference with forest management as-
sociated with the annual ad valorem taxes. Provisions within the tim-
ber yield tax structure also stabilize timber tax revenue to the
counties. 39  Environmentalists are satisfied with the one-time assess-
ment because the tax consequences no longer influence ecological
decisions.40
The problems created for the county governments by the ad valorem
timber tax system were not as easily eliminated. The timber yield tax
does not provide an annual assessment, therefore, it creates a fluctuat-
ing source of income for the counties. Special provisions were incorpo-
rated within the timber yield tax to provide a steady and predictable
33. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §30).
34. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 835. The requirement of a seventy percent cut
to qualify for the exemption also encouraged owners to deplete the forest resources rapidly, result-
ing in erosion and other ecological imbalances. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 835.
35. See REvmw, supra note 11, at 379. The annual tax liability discouraged timber owners
from leaving trees standing for highway buffer zones, for wildlife habitat, or for aesthetic benefits.
See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 835; REVIEW, supra note 11, at 379.
36. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 842; REviEw, supra note 11, at 378.
37. See Ravinw, supra note 11, at 378.
38. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§38108-38110.
39. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 841-42. Timber owners may choose to leave
timber standing without suffering a tax liability because the tax liability is now determined using
the "immediate harvest value" as of the "scaling date," i.e. the stumpage value of the timber as of
the date of harvest or sale. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §§38108, 38109. Stumpage is "the value of or
price paid for timber as it stands uncut in the woods," WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTIoNARY 2270 (1971).
40. See Unkel & Cromwell, supra note 13, at 840.
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income to the counties based on the average annual property tax reve-
nue for previous years.4'
The timber yield tax was enacted to meet criticism voiced by timber
owners, environmentalists, and local government, and appears to have
met the respective concerns. Nowhere during the legislative process,
however, does it appear that the special status of Indian timber was
considered.
C. Relationship of the Timber Yield Tax to Indian Timber
The state of California is not responsible for the management of for-
est resources on Indian lands located within the state. Federal and
tribal policies control the timber operations on these lands.42 Federal
regulations control the time and place of harvest and determine the
conditions of sale, yet it is the state of California which imposes a tax.
California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 38104 defines a tim-
ber owner for purposes of the assessment of the timber yield tax as
"any person who owns timber immediately prior to felling or the first
person who acquires . . title .. to timber after it has been felled
from land owned by a federal agency or any. . entity exempt from
property taxation. .... 43 Indian timber,44 and Indian land,45 are ex-
empt from direct taxation. The timber yield tax is, therefore, assessed
against any person or non-exempt entity buying timber from a tribe.
Since the Indian timber was exempt from the ad valorem tax, the
legislative purpose of eliminating the problems associated with that tax
should not extend to the Indian interests. Tribal timber is under the
direct supervision of the Secretary of the Interior46 (hereinafter referred
to as the Secretary). By statutory mandate the Secretary manages the
forests according to principles of sustained yield,4 7 i.e., regulation of
cutting and reforesting to ensure continuous production.4 8 The Secre-
tary is also authorized to leave trees standing to preserve the forest in
its natural state for environmental reasons,4 9 to preserve wildlife
habitat,"0 or for purely aesthetic reasons.5'
41. CAL. GOV'T CODE §27423; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§38905, 38906.
42. 25 U.S.C. §§406, 407 (1976); 25 C.F.R. §§141.6, 141.7 (1981).
43. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §38104.
44. See White Mountain Apache v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 (1980); Squire v. Capoeman,
351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956). See generally Note, Natural Resources: Federal Control Over Indian Timber,
5 AM. INDLAN L. REv. 415 (1977).
45. 25 U.S.C. §465 (1976).
46. 25 U.S.C. §466 (1976); 25 C.F.R. §§141.1-141.23, 142.1-142.12, 144.1-144.15 (1981).
47. 25 U.S.C. §466 (1976); 25 C.F.R. §141.4 (1981).
48. 25 C.F.R. §§141.3(a)(1), (a)(2) (1981).
49. Id. §141.3(a)(6).50. Id. § 141.3(a)(7).51. Id. §141.3(a)(5).
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The concerns which prompted the enactment of the timber yield
tax, 2 therefore, do not apply to Indian timber. Resource management
concerns of timber owners53 and environmentalists54 are inapplicable
to Indian land. Furthermore, since Indian timber was exempt from
taxation, the local government revenue concerns55 do not justify appli-
cation of the timber yield tax.
In approving the timber yield tax, the California Legislature did not
consider the unique position of purchasers of Indian timber. The rea-
sons for replacing the ad valorem system of timber taxation have no
application to purchasers of Indian timber. By extending the timber
yield tax to purchasers of Indian timber, the state has exceeded the
intent and purpose of the legislation and raised doubts as to the validity
of this application in light of principles of Indian law.
PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN LAW
A discussion of law as it relates to Indians, Indian property and res-
ervation land involves a unique analysis. Because of the historical de-
velopment of law affecting the Indian in America, many traditional
legal principles do not apply. "The fact that Indians are involved gives
the basic doctrines and concepts of the field a new quirk which some-
times carries unpredictable consequences. 5 6
In 1832, the Supreme Court established that a state does not have
jurisdiction over Indians or land within the reservation. 57 This total
lack of jurisdiction has been modified by judicial decree and statute.
Today there exists a complicated network of laws determining jurisdic-
tion over various aspects of Indian jurisprudence which reflects the
changing attitudes and philosophies toward Native Americans."
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has applied three tests to de-
termine the validity of a state tax imposed against non-Indians: in-
fringement of tribal self-government 59 federal preemption of state
taxing power,6° and balancing of tribal interests against those of the
state.6 1 These three tests will be discussed and applied to the timber
52. See text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
53. See note 32 supra.
54. See note 35 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
56. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW xxii (1945).
57. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 529 (1832).
58. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). See generally
Barsh, Issues in Federal, State, and Tribal Taxation of Reservation Wealth: A Survey and Economic
Critique, 54 WASH. L. REv. 531 (1979).
59. See text accompanying notes 64-82 infra.
60. See text accompanying notes 96-132 infra.
61. See text accompanying notes 145-151 infra.
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yield tax to determine the validity of the assessment against purchasers
of Indian timber.
A. State Infringement of Tribal Sef-Government
Tribal governments existed prior to the formation of the government
of the United States. The United States originally treated these govern-
mental units as sovereign entities with whom treaties were made.62 As
the United States expanded and tribes became less threatening, their
legal status declined, and Indian reservation lands became encom-
passed within state boundaries. When conflicts arise between the states
and the Indians, the federal courts intervene. One test the courts use to
resolve these conflicts is to determine whether the state has interfered
with the "sovereign" tribal government. If the interference is severe
enough to infringe tribal self-government, then the state action is
invalid.63
1. The Nature of the Infringement Test
In Williams v. Lee' the Court first articulated the test that a state
action could not "infring[e] on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them. ' 65 Williams involved a non-In-
dian storeowner, operating on the reservation, who attempted to use
the state courts to collect money owed him for the sale of goods to an
Indian couple. The issue was whether the state court had jurisdiction
over the couple for the transaction occurring within reservation bound-
aries. The Court applied the infringement test and determined that the
exercise of jurisdiction by the state would undermine the function of
the tribal courts and interfere with the rights of the Indians to govern
themselves.66 Thus, the state could not maintain jurisdiction over the
dispute.
The infringement test has not been limited to determinations ofjuris-
diction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal applied the infringement
test in a challenge to the possessory interest tax imposed by the state of
California on lessees of tribal lands.67 The Court emphasized in Fort
Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino68 that the tribe was not being
62. See Metder, A Unffied Theory of Indan Tribal Sovereignty, 30 HASTINGS L.. 89, 90-94
(1979).
63. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
64. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
65. Id. at 220.
66. Id. at 223.
67. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
68. Id.
1331
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"subjected to direct state court process"' 69 as was the Indiaii couple in
Williams. The state action only indirectly affected the tribe. The im-
position of the tax reduced the revenues of the tribe from these land
leases,70 but this was not a sufficient interference to support a claim of
infringement of tribal self-government.7 1
Taxes with only indirect burdens, such as the possessory interest tax,
are not sufficient to invalidate the state tax. Tribes attempted to assume
a more direct tax burden by entering into contracts of indemnification
with non-Indian taxpayers.72 For example, an indemnity agreement
between the Mescalero Apache Tribe and a building contractor work-
ing on the reservation required that the tribe reimburse the contractor
for all taxes assessed on gross receipts for work done on the reserva-
tion.73 The court rejected this tax burden by contract in Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, stating that the tax burden only indirectly
affected the tribe.74 The tax did not infringe on the tribe's right to
make its own laws.75
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes76 was another attempt
by the Court to delineate the scope of state taxing power over non-
Indians dealing with Indians. The tribes claimed an exemption from
the state sales tax on cigarettes sold to non-Indians from smokeshops77
located on the reservation. The Court accepted the conclusion of the
lower court that the direct burden on the tax was on the purchaser,78
thereby stating that the tribe suffered only incidentally even though the
smokeshops would lose all non-Indian business. Even though the state
required the tribe to collect the tax and keep records of sales to Indians
and non-Indians, the Court determined that this was a minimal burden
on the Indian smokeshop operators.7 9 The Court also distinguished
between the state-imposed collection and record keeping requirements
and a direct state tax. Since the collection of the tax is not itself a tax,
states may impose this burden80 without the direct grant of authority
required in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones."' Neither the indirect ec-
onomic impact nor the collection requirement was sufficient state inter-
69. Id. at 1258.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1072-73 (D.N.M. 1977).
73. Id. at 1066.
74. Id. at 1072.
75. Id. at 1073.
76. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
77. A smokeshop is a business, located on the reservation and usually close to the non-Indian
population, from which cigarettes and other tobacco products are sold.
78. Id. at 482.
79. Id. at 483.
80. Id.
81. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
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ference to frustrate tribal self-government. 82
As these cases indicate, a state tax not directly imposed against an
Indian or Indian property is not likely to be a sufficient infringement to
invalidate the tax. The timber yield tax is assessed against those
purchasing timber from the reservation and is therefore an indirect
burden.
2. Application of the Infringement Test to the Timber Yield Tax
The timber yield tax is not a direct tax burden on the tribes. Com-
parison of the timber yield tax to the cases leads to a prediction of
validity. Even if the economic impact of the tax were totally to destroy
the tribal timber operations, this would be insufficient to constitute an
interference with self-government under the rationale of Moe.13 The
tax on timber can be distinguished from a tax on cigarettes because of
the close relation to reservation activities; this distinction, however, is
not sufficient to provide the necessary infringement under the holding
of Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino.4 Since the interest
of the Indian lessee was not sufficiently connected to tribal government
to defeat the possessory interest tax,85 it is doubtful any distinction for
timber would be upheld. Even if a contract were entered into between
the Indians and purchasers requiring the tribe to indemnify the pur-
chasers for the taxes paid, it would not be a sufficient burden under
O'Cheskey.86 Using the infringement test as articulated and applied in
WqIliams,8 7 Fort Mojave,88 O'Cheskey,s9 and Moe,90 the state action of
taxing timber purchasers does not infringe on the right of reservation
Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by them." 91 Although
the tax is valid under the infringement test, validity must be deter-
mined also under the preemption and balancing tests.
B. Federal Preemption of State Taxing Power
Federal preemption of state authority is not a doctrine unique to In-
dian law. Traditional notions of preemption developed to resolve con-
flicts between state and federal authority to regulate commerce whereas
the Indian law preemption doctrine emerged from the concept of tribal
82. 425 U.S. at 483.
83. Id. at 481-83.
84. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976).
85. See id. at 1258.
86. 439 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.M. 1977). See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
87. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
88. 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
89. 439 F. Supp. 1063 (D.N.M. 1977). See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra.
90. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). See text accompanying notes 76-82 supra.
91. 358 U.S. at 220.
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sovereignty.92 "The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty
make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating
Indian tribes those standards of preemption that have emerged in other
areas of the law."93 Once the federal government establishes a reserva-
tion the authority to govern that reservation becomes plenary and any
attempt to regulate reservation activities by the state is preempted.94 If
Congress has established a comprehensive scheme of regulations over
Indian activity, the state is precluded from regulating any aspect of the
activity, either on or off the reservation.95
1. The Nature of the Preemption Test
The Indian preemption test was first used to defeat a state taxing
statute in 1965 in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission.96 A
trader, licensed under federal authority, challenged the state tax on his
income derived from trading with Indians on the reservation. An oper-
ator of a trading post on a reservation is required to have a government
license 97 and is subject to strict regulations including the type, quantity,
and price of goods to be sold, the business records to be kept, the man-
ner of payment for goods traded, and the type of conduct forbidden on
the business premises.98 The Court stated that the "all-inclusive" na-
ture of these regulations left no room for the state to impose any addi-
tional burdens upon the non-Indian trader.99 The Court also
determined that, by enacting these regulations, Congress intended to
occupy this field of activity and the state was not to interfere.10° The
state interference would "disturb and disarrange the statutory plan
Congress set up in order to protect Indians . ,,*"1o 1
The Court turned to the interest the state might have in imposing the
92. Note, State Taxation ofBsiness Conductedon Indian Reservations, 34 TAX LAW. 454,459
(1981); Indian Law-Federal Law Preempts State Authority to Tax On-Reservation Transactions,
/27 WAYNE L. REv. 1259, 1267 (1981). See generally Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A
Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979,
1007 (1981).
93. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
94. Id.
The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject of some confu-
sion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility
for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973).
95. See Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 163-64 (1980).
See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Warren Trading
Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
96. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
97. 25 U.S.C. §§261, 264 (1976).
98. 380 U.S. at 689 (citing 25 C.F.R. §§251.3, 251.5, 251.8, 251.9, 251.18, 251.19, 251.21,
252.3, 252.15).
99. 380 U.S. at 690.
100. Id. at 691.
101. Id.
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tax, dismissing the possibility by stating the Congress had left the state
free from any duties or responsibilities toward the Indians; therefore,
Congress would not have intended the state to have the privilege of
imposing this tax.' °2 This left open the possibility for a state to specify
duties or responsibilities toward a reservation as justification for the
imposition of a tax. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission10 3
clarified this question.
McClanahan involved a challenge to a direct tax on the income of a
tribal member that was earned from activities solely within the reserva-
tion boundaries. The Court articulated the broad principles of Indian
sovereignty and federal preemption as a groundwork for examining the
relevant treaties and statutes delineating the scope of the federal, tribal
and state authority over reservation activities. 1°4 These principles are
that treaties and statutes are to be read against a backdrop of Indian
sovereignty'05 with doubtful expressions resolved in favor of the Indi-
ans, 106 and services and privileges provided by the state do not alter the
tax exempt status of reservation Indians. The status "can only be
changed by treaty stipulation, or a voluntary abandonment of their tri-
bal organization.""1 7
Although the Court attempted to limit the McClanahan holding to
similar situations on direct taxation of reservation Indians, 10 8 these
broad principles have been applied to the preemption analysis of taxes
imposed on non-Indians dealing with reservation Indians. In Washing-
ton v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation0 9 (herein-
after referred to as Colville), the Court applied the McClanahan
principles to statutes promoting tribal self-government and the estab-
lishment of tribal businesses as well as to the relevant treaties in an
attempt to find a basis for preemption." 0 Giving these statutes and
treaties the broadest reading possible, the Court was still unable to find
any provision that would preempt the state tax on sales of cigarettes to
non-Indians. Although the imposition of this sales tax would destroy
the tribal smokeshop businesses, even this, against the backdrop of sov-
ereignty and the general policies of self-government, was not enough to
overcome the legitimate governmental interests of the state."'
102. Id.
103. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
104. Id. at 172-73.
105. Id. at 172.
106. Id. at 174 (citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)).
107. Id. at 173 n.12 (citing The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 756 (1866).
108. 411 U.S. at 168.
109. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
110. Id. at 155.
111. Id. at 157.
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Two other cases involving the specialized doctrines of federal pre-
emption were decided the same month as Colville: Central Machinery
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission I2 and V/irte Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker.113 Central Machinery involved the imposition of a
transaction privilege tax on the non-Indian, Central Machinery Com-
pany, for a sale of farm equipment to the tribe. Central Machinery
Company was not a licensed trader, did not maintain a permanent
place of business on the reservation, and was not involved in more than
one sale to the tribe. Nevertheless, the Court determined that the In-
dian trader statutes preempted the imposition of the state tax. 1 4 Ana-
lyzing the Indian trader statutes, the Court determined that the purpose
of the extensive regulation of trade with the Indians was to protect the
Indians from potentially unscrupulous dealings of non-Indians. These
regulations could not be avoided by the non-Indian party's choosing to
have only a single encounter with the tribe. The Court cited exten-
sively from Warren Trading Post,1' emphasizing that the enactment of
comprehensive regulations by Congress precludes the state from legis-
lating on the same subject. 1 6
The companion case of "hite Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker
1 7
interrelated the principles articulated in the previous cases. The state
attempted to impose motor carrier license and use fuel taxes on a non-
Indian enterprise hauling timber on the reservation under a contract
with the tribal timber corporation. Citing Warren Trading Post and
McClanahan as examples of the preemption and infringement tests,1 18
the Court set forth the test to be applied when non-Indians engage in
activities on the reservation. The Court examined the language of the
relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies
that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed
from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not
dependent on mechanical or. absolute conceptions of state or tribal sov-
ereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state author-
ity would violate federal law.119
This analysis was then applied to the facts of Bracker to determine
that the regulation of Indian timber and tribal roads was comprehen-
112. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
113. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
114. 448 U.S. at 163-64.
115. See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 n.18.
116. 448 U.S. at 165-66.
117. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
118. Id. at 145.
119. Id. at 144-45.
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sive, leaving no room for state taxation.1 20 The imposition of the tax
threatened the federal objective of guaranteeing that the tribe "receive
...the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding
.... ,"121 The taxes undermined the Secretary's ability to make the
wide range of determinations committed to his authority, including fees
and rates with respect to the harvesting and sale of tribal timber122
thereby reducing tribal revenues from such sales. 23 The "imposition
of state taxes. . . adversely affect[ed] the Tribe's ability to comply with
the sustained-yield management policies imposed by federal law"'124
and reduced the sums of money available for federally required admin-
istrative expenses."z The Court also concluded that the state did not
have a legitimate governmental reason for imposing the taxe§, i.e., the
taxes were not imposed in return for governmental services nor did
they perform a regulatory purpose.1 26 The state's "generalized interest
in raising revenues. . .[was not] sufficient to permit its proposed intru-
sion into the federal regulatory scheme with respect to the harvesting
and sale of tribal timber."'127
Combining the principles enunciated in Bracker with those of the
earlier preemption cases, the preemption doctrine has developed to
contain four general requirements:
1. The minute details of the Indian-non-Indian transaction must
be covered by a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of federal
regulations.128
2. The imposition of the state tax must be contrary to the federal
policy of encouraging the specific Indian activity.'29
3. The federal regulations and policies must be read against a back-
drop of Indian sovereignty with any doubtful expressions being con-
strued in favor of the Indians.13
0
4. The state must be assessing the tax in return for significant gov-
ernmental functions' 31 or to further legitimate regulatory purposes
3 2
120. Id. at 148.
121. Id. at 149 (quoting 25 C.F.R. §141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 149-50.
125. Id. at 150.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. Compare Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Cosnm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 165-66
(1980) and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145-48 (1980) and Warren
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 688-90 (1965) with Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-59 (1980).
129. See 448 U.S. at 167-68; 448 U.S. at 149; 380 U.S. at 686-90.
130. See 448 U.S. at 143-44; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Conm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75
(1973).
131. See Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 476 (1976).
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in order to outweigh the interests of the tribe and federal government.
All four requirements must be considered in determining the validity
of a state tax.
2 4pplication of the Preemption Test to the Timber Yield Tax
The application of these four criteria to the timber yield tax parallels
the development of the preemption argument in Bracker. Both the
timber yield tax and the motor carrier license and use fuel taxes as-
sessed in Bracker involve the imposition of a direct tax on a non-Indian
contracting with the tribe or tribal timber corporation. In addition,
both involve an examination of federal regulation of Indian timber.
This parallel analysis leads to the same result reached in Bracker, the
imposition of a state tax indirectly burdening the management of In-
dian timber lands is preempted by federal regulations.
The first requirement of the preemption analysis is to determine if
the transaction between the Indian and non-Indian is controlled by an
all-inclusive set of federal regulations. Congress has authorized the
Secretary to make rules and regulations necessary for the management
of Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield manage-
ment. 3 3 These regulations are set forth in Title 25, Code of Federal
Regulations, Sections 141.1-141.23 and 142.1-142.12. They cover not
only every aspect of timber management and harvesting, but also tim-
ber sales, including the advertisement,13 4 acceptance, and rejection of
bids,' 35 contract terms, 36 and terms of payment.1 37 The purchaser of
timber from a tribe, whether standing timber or that milled by a timber
corporation, is actually contracting for that purchase with the United
States through the Secretary of the Interior. 3 1 Every aspect of the
transaction is controlled by all-inclusive and comprehensive
regulations.
The second requirement of the preemption analysis requires a deter-
uination of the federal policy regarding Indian timber. This policy is
one of protection. The Court recognized, in Squire v. Capoeman 139 that
timber, unlike other crops, is integrally related to the value of the land,
and that the value should be preserved for the individual Indians. 140
The regulations controlling the timber operations also reflect the con-
132. See 448 U.S. at 150.
133. 25 U.S.C. §,66 (1976).
134. 25 C.F.R. §§141.8, 141.9, 142.5, 142.6 (1981).
135. Id. §141.11.
136. Id. §§141.12, 141.13, 142.9.
137. Id. §§141.15, 142.9, 142.10.
138. Id. §§141.7, 141.13, 142.7.
139. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
140. See Id. at 10.
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cern of preserving the value of the timber land."' The objectives of the
regulations further state that the development of forests should provide
the Indians with whatever profit the forests are capable of yielding. 42
The imposition of the timber yield tax deprives the Indians of the maxi-
mum profit possible, thus destroying an integral part of the wealth of
the reservation.
The third requirement of the preemption analysis calls for an exami-
nation of the federal regulations against the backdrop of Indian sover-
eignty, construing doubtful expressions in favor of the Indians. The
federal regulations and policies concerning Indian timber are clear cut
and unambiguous. This rule of construction is unnecessary, to reach
the conclusion that the federal government intends to occupy the entire
field of timber management on reservation lands.
The final requirement in the analysis requires a balancing of the
state's interest with those of the tribe and the federal government. As
discussed previously,'43 the state of California has no regulatory inter-
est in Indian timber, nor has the state provided services in response to
the timber yield tax. The only interest of California in assessing the
timber yield tax against purchasers of Indian timber is revenue raising.
Thus, "[wihere, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken com-
prehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal timber, where
a number of the policies underlying the federal regulatory scheme are
threatened by the taxes [the state] seek[s] to impose, and where [the
state is] unable to justify the taxes except in terms of a generalized in-
terest in raising revenue, the proposed exercise of state authority is im-
permissible."'" The timber yield tax is preempted by federal
regulations. The timber yield tax also must be examined using the
third test which requires a more detailed balancing of interests.
C Balancing State Taxing Power with TribalAutonomy
Balancing of interests is a familiar concept in constitutional law.
When Indian interests are weighed against those of the state, the exam-
ination must consider the historical development of the legal standing
of tribal governments. Tribal interests include the doctrine of sover-
eignty and the requirement that the tribes be free from state infringe-
ment. The interest of the federal government in controlling Indian
activity also must be included in the balance. The state's interests in-
141. 25 C.F.R. §141.3(a)(1) (1981).
142. Id. §141.3(a)(3).
143. See text accompanying notes 42-55 supra.
144. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980).
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clude preventing tribes from marketing their exempt status and main-
taining taxing power over non-Indians who receive state services.
L The Nature of the Balancing Test
The Court articulated the factors of the balancing test in the 1980
decision of Washington v. Confederated. Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation."' The facts of Colville were similar to those of Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes. 46 The state was taxing sales of
cigarettes from Indian smokeshops. The tribes in Colville imposed
their own tribal tax on cigarette sales to non-Indians and thereby
claimed the tribal tax ousted the imposition of a state tax on the same
sales. The tribes argued that the imposition of the state sales tax would
not only destroy a source of revenue, but also would deprive the tribes
of essential governmental services that were funded in part by the tribal
tax.' 47 The Court did not use the same analysis as was used in Moe to
determine the validity of the tribe's claims. Instead, elements of the
infringement test and elements of the preemption test 148 were used to
create a balancing test. The tribe's interest in sovereignty and self-gov-
ernment and the federal government's interest as expressed through
congressional policies were balanced against the state's interest in im-
posing a tax on non-Indians. The balance appeared to be weighted in
favor of the Indians, but the Court equalized the scales with the state-
ment that
[w]hile the Tribes do have an interest in raising revenues for essential
governmental programs, that interest is strongest when the revenues
are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities in-
volving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal
services. The State also has a legitimate governmental interest in
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax
is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the re-
cipient of state services.' 4 9
The state sales tax on cigarettes sold to non-Indians was upheld us-
ing this balancing test. The sale of cigarettes raised money for essential
tribal governmental programs, but these sales were not generated by
reservation activities; the tribe was instead marketing a tax exemption.
The non-Indian purchasers were not the recipients of any tribal serv-
ices. On the other hand, the tax by the state was "reasonably designed
to prevent the Tribes from marketing their exemption to nonmem-
145. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
146. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
147. 447 U.S. at 156.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 156-57.
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bers,"'15 who were presumably the recipients of state services.1 51 The
state tax on cigarette sales was upheld. The balancing test applied to
the timber yield tax, however, reaches a different result.
2. Application of the Balancing Test to the Timber Yield Tax
The state tax on timber is different from the cigarette tax upheld in
Colville. These differences require the balance to tip in favor of the
Indians, thereby invalidating the tax. The balancing test states that the
tribal interest is strongest when:
(1) "The revenues are derived from value generated on the reserva-
tion. .. ,52 There are few activities which are more closely related to
the reservation than forestry. Timber may represent the major value of
reservation land'53 and a major source of revenue to those holding such
land.154
(2) "The taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services."' 55  The tax-
payer-purchaser of timber enjoys the use of roads maintained by the
tribe156 and benefits from timber management practices,15 7 harvesting
procedures, and milling operations. 5 The taxpayer is also the direct
recipient of services under the contract of sale with the tribe, the terms
of which are subject to extensive federal control.'59
On the other side of the scale the state's interest is strongest when:
(1) "The tax is directed at off-reservation value."' 60  "Off-reserva-
tion value" is not defined in Colville, but apparently cigarettes have this
value. The Court expressed concern over the possibility of a tribe mar-
keting a tax exemption and building commercial enterprises based on
the competitive advantage of a tax exemption, implying that an "off-
reservation value" could be assigned to those goods readily available in
a non-Indian market. Indian timber is not such a commodity.' 61 In-
dian timber is inextricably connected with the reservation land. 62
150. Id. at 157.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 156-57. Application of the Indian preemption doctrine does not require direct
conflict of federal and state law.
153. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956).
154. Id.
155. 447 U.S. at 157.
156. See white Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
157. 25 C.F.R. §§141.1-141.23 (1981).
158. Id. §§142.1-142.12.
159. Id. §§141.10-141.17, 142.4-142.12.
160. 447 U.S. at 157.
161. The timber yield tax also differs from the cigarette taxes in that prior to the timber yield
tax the state did not have a legitimate governmental interest in taxing exempt Indian timber. The
sale of cigarettes by the tribes, on the other hand, was a direct attempt by the tribe to circumvent
an existing tax and market an exemption.
162. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 10 (1956).
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(2) "The taxpayer is the recipient of state services."' 163 The tax-
payer, purchaser of timber, may not even be a resident of the state.
The only state services he may receive are those necessary to travel to
the reservation. The state interest in imposing the timber yield tax is
not strong enough to tip the balance in its favor and the tax is invalid
using this balancing test.
CONCLUSION
Dissatisfaction with the ad valorem tax structure led to the enact-
ment of the timber yield tax. The Legislature remedied many of the
problems of the previous ad valorem system through the timber yield
tax but, by so doing, extended the tax to persons beyond the state's
taxing power. The purchasers of Indian timber are uniquely situated,
and any tax assessed against them must comply with the principles of
Indian law.
The principles of Indian law discussed in this comment involve con-
stitutional issues: the infringement test based on sovereignty, the pre-
emption test based on federal supremacy, and the balancing test based
on state and tribal interests. Any court determining the validity of a
statute may wish to avoid these constitutional questions by giving the
statute a narrow interpretation based upon the history, intent, and ef-
fect of this legislation. This comment has pointed out that the Legisla-
ture did not specifically intend for the timber yield tax to be extended
to the purchasers of Indian timber. The statute was designed to elimi-
nate the problems of the previous tax system which did not affect the
Irdians. The court would have to determine that the Indian timber
was exempt from taxation. The exemption would disallow any tax on
the timber no matter from whom the state attempted to collect.
Assuming a court finds that the imposition of the timber yield tax
against purchasers of Indian timber is a valid exercise of the state's
taxing power, the court must then face the constitutional questions.
The tax must be measured against the infringement test, the preemp-
tion test, and the balancing test. This comment has discussed the devel-
opment of these tests and has determined that the preemption and
balancing tests may be used to invalidate the tax. Using the preemp-
tion test, the comprehensive and all-inclusive nature of the federal reg-
ulations leaves no room for the additional burden of the timber yield
tax. Using the balancing test, the state's interest in raising revenue is
outweighed by the tribal and federal policies of preserving the timber
for the benefit of the Indians.
163. 447 U.S. at 157.
1342
1982 / Taxation of Indian Timber
Faced with these three alternative analyses of the imposition of the
timber yield tax to purchasers of Indian timber, a court may determine
that imposition is beyond the intent of the statute or that the principles
of Indian law override the state's authority in this area. Regardless of
the analysis chosen, the result is the same-the state of California can-
not impose the timber yield tax on purchasers of Indian timber.
Margaret Vick
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